The Prince is a book published in 1532 that was written by the statesman Nicolo Machiavelli that serves as a book of advice for aspiring politicians and princes, as well as potentially acting as a satire (Machiavelli wrote down many of his observations in his book by observing how princes fought each other, after all). The Prince is a great book on strategy and the importance of qualities like ruthlessness along with more respectable ones like bravery. To clarify, my edition of The Prince is the one on the link for Amazon, and it includes the biographies of leaders who succeeded due to their ingenuity (ex. an extremely capable general named Castruccio who died at the age of 44, having won many victories only to die to a fever) - because they’re technically not a part of The Prince, I will refrain from describing them, leaving the reader something to study.
Machiavelli begins his book with a dedication to the “magnificent” Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici, an aristocrat. His dedication states that while most people who try to ingratiate themselves to people in power give physical goods, he offers something more: his experience and observations, which is no less in value. That is, “Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness. Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.” (3). Machiavelli states that his work was made intentionally short and terse to quickly and effectively communicate the information, and that if he is grateful for the gift, he can help Machiavelli to express his gratitude: “And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.” (3). Machiavelli states that governments are either republics or principalities: while the rulers of principalities inherit power according to familial succession, republics have leaders that are chosen in a more democratic process. He states that when it comes to the princes ruling principalities, they can generally expect the people to have their backs, seeing that if they don’t commit egregious acts against them, they should remain loyal to them, especially if their family is a longstanding one: “For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.” (4). Machiavelli describes that new principalities that are taken by princes should not be excessively tampered with: he encourages princes to let newly conquered areas retain most of their laws and traditions, as they can potentially rebel if their personal lives are intruded upon. He also calls for princes to exterminate the family of the previous rulers in order to make reverting to the previous aristocracy difficult: “He who has annexed them [new principalities], if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old principality.” (5). He states that if a newly acquired territory is very different to the old principality due to laws, language, and traditions, the prince will do well to go and stay there himself in order to introduce a feeling of dominance and control, as well as to respond quickly to potential threats: “if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.” (6). Machiavelli says that colonies of people can be sent to new territories to ensure loyalty, seeing that colonists are generally the destitute who are willing to go to new areas, as they have little material possessions keeping them back. While it’s true that some of the inhabitants of the newly conquered area will be forced out of their homes, Machiavelli describes that due to the fact that they’re poor and relatively few, they can’t change and protest much, and that the vast majority of people, unwilling to potentially lose their own possessions by making their dissatisfaction known, will keep quiet to appease the prince. This directly supports Machiavelli’s following observation: “Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.” (6). Machiavelli states that having garrisons of soldiers is quite useless, seeing that although they are armed, they require a large amount of food and may arouse resentment and suspicion if they are to move around too much.
Machiavelli then talks about how to deal with problems as a whole: it is best for them to be remedied as quickly as possible, seeing how they only become more detectable when they increase in severity, not unlike certain diseases: princes “must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy.” (7). Machiavelli then tells the story of King Louis XII, who failed to conquer land due to the following mistakes: “he destroyed the minor powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send colonies … a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage.” (9). Machiavelli focuses heavily on not displaying weakness by making concessions to other rulers, especially if such concessions involve joint rule. Machiavelli writes that some governments involve not only a prince but nobles (barons). Therefore, if one takes over that territory, they should focus on dealing with the nobles too. Machiavelli provides the following options when it comes to the level of interference directed towards newly conquered territories: “Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.” (11). Machiavelli again speaks of destroying those who wouldn’t be shown kindness: he states that while principalities are used to living under the dominion of a prince, republics aren’t. That is, “in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.” (12). Machiavelli states that capable princes should not rely on fortune: the less luck they need to obtain power, the more consistent their control over their areas will be, seeing how those who are dependent on luck can be easily overthrown - “Those who by valorous ways become princes … acquire a principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them … It is necessary, therefore … to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered.” (13).
In contrast to princes who got their kingdoms due to their abilities, “Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they have not difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it” (14). Said princes have little practical experience and knowledge when it comes to how to successfully run a kingdom, which will only cause them trouble, seeing how soldiers generally aren’t very well disposed towards private citizens. Machiavelli tells the story of a duke who was quite successful, though he did not ultimately accomplish his final goal. However, Machiavelli states that it is highly recommended that most of his experience and tactics are to be followed: “Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man.” (18). Machiavelli then states that people rebel and harm others due to either fear or hatred: the duke’s mistake lay in insulting other powerful people, which led to his downfall, seeing how people generally never forget previous insults, hearkening back to the phrase that people should either be treated well or utterly annihilated. Machiavelli comes to discuss princes who have won their territories by utilizing terrible and brutal means (ex. slaughtering large numbers of people and potentially their own families): if a terrible deed (ex. mass executions, purges) have to be conducted, they need a valid justification, and should be done as quickly as possible, seeing that protracting the affair will only cause most people to become afraid for their own lives and to begin harboring treasonous thoughts. Another reason, obviously, is to give those who are going to be punished little time to react and to rebel. As Machiavelli himself detailed, “Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than decrease … It is impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves … Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at once, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer. And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them.” (21). Machiavelli proceeds to discuss a civil principality, which is “where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of fellow citizens … nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.” (22). That is, principalities are founded either by the people or the aristocrats. Machiavelli states that while the people are more easily satisfied than the nobles and are more moral than them (they simply don’t want to be exploited), the nobles can prove to be quite useful, and could be used to your advantage. Machiavelli outlines, “Those who so bind themselves and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him. Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours … it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.” (22-3). Machiavelli advises for princes to add strictness to their characteristics: even if the people do like them, in the case of a war they are likely to not fight for their prince out of fear, even if they promised beforehand. Therefore, keeping them dependent on the state is a great safeguard against cowardice. As he put it, “a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few … Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.” (24).
If a prince finds himself in a war, he should be careful and practice foresight: if the enemy burns some properties outside the walls of his kingdom, he is highly encouraged to keep those who had lost their belongings calm, seeing that the damage has already been done: enemy forces only want them to rush in recklessly. Furthermore, once the damage has all been done, those who lost their property in defense of the prince are likely to fight for him, seeing their desire for vengeance and the sunk costs already associated with their relationship to the prince, “For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they receive.” (25). Machiavelli states that the church is powerful and has tremendous influence, making it necessary to appease it in order to ensure a stable rule. Regarding an army, Machiavelli advises princes to avoid mercenaries and auxiliaries as much as possible, as they have no loyalty to the group they are currently fighting for, are bound only by money (since they can probably make money somewhere else, they can flee out of cowardice when an actual war begins), and can betray the prince if they are successful (by occupying the territory and demanding higher wages). As Machiavelli put it, “Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed what they were.” (27). Machiavelli states that if one looks at history, the most successful armies are those composed of genuine citizens, not foreigners. Machiavelli states that auxiliaries are just as useless as mercenaries, seeing that they are called in times of emergency as backup, but only turn against the respective prince if they win: “These arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.” (30). In fact, it can be stated that auxiliaries are more dangerous than mercenaries, for they are organized and are fully capable of extortion and betrayal: “Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.” (31). Machiavelli writes more of war, stating that princes, if they wish to maintain a good reputation, need to be in the army, as that is a title of notable respect and gives them legitimacy in the eyes of their armies. Furthermore, he says the art of war is the most important discipline for a prince: those that practice it on the battlefield and study it in books are much likelier to do well over long periods of time than those who neglect this study. Machiavelli states that armies should be kept disciplined and capable at all times, and that princes should know the surrounding area well, as “Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.” (33). Machiavelli elaborates, stating that when one learns history, one should focus on what the people of the past (in this case the generals) did well, and what follies caused their respective downfalls. The art of war can be practiced in one’s imagination as well: thinking about it much of the time is an effective way to practice. All in all, “A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows.” (34).
Machiavelli details that princes should try to keep their reputations as unblemished and positive as possible: this can be done by publicly refraining from frowned-upon behavior and pretending to possess admirable traits - fake it until you make it. Machiavelli states that princes shouldn’t practice too much liberality with their spending: if they spend a large amount of money on the public, they probably need to tax the common people a large sum of money, which can incur resentment. Machiavelli portrayed, “any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly … if he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.” (35-6). Machiavelli states that it’s fine if an army pillages other areas, as the belongings they’re taking and giving away to other people do not belong to the prince: liberality is only damaging when it involves one giving away one’s own resources. Machiavelli states once more than it is better to be viewed as miserly than liberal, as the former is more sustainable and doesn’t involve dissolute ways to attempt to find new paths of revenue. Machiavelli moves on to discuss the major question of whether it is better to be loved or feared: while cruelty is indeed horrible and unfortunate, it can easily be more effective than kindness in the long-run, as victories in wars are determined more by ruthlessness than clemency: “a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual only.” (37). While cruelty can be practiced by princes, Machiavelli recommends that their actions have justifications, as princes shouldn’t be viewed as brutal and unreasonable, seeing that foresight and a degree of rationality are needed for an ideal rule: “Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable.” (37). Machiavelli then clarifies that while it would be great to be both loved and feared, if one has to choose one over the other, it is better to be feared, seeing that humans are insecure, greedy, selfish, and distrustful animals: while it’s also true that they may know gratitude, sympathy, empathy, and loyalty, the former qualities are quite likely to override the latter. “Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved … in general … men … are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.” (37). Adding to his explanation, Machiavelli states that princes should avoid tarnishing their reputations if they rule by fear, since they are still massively outnumbered by the common people: princes should therefore leave their people largely alone, including refraining from taking by force their material possessions and family. To demonstrate this principle, Macchiavelli discusses Hannibal: his forces never deserted him due to how his “inhuman cruelty” and “boundless valour” “made him revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers”: “without that cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect.” (38). Machiavelli ends the section with the following words: “Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must endeavour only to avoid hatred” (38).
Machiavelli describes that princes have two ways to make people adhere to their promises: they can either use the law and the force, the first “proper to men” and “the second to beasts”; “but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second.” (39). Machiavelli pays attention to Greek myths: many heroes were trained under centaurs, who were half-beast and half-man, representing the importance of the law and force in a proper education. He says that princes should be the embodiments of two animals: foxes and lions, as foxes are intelligent enough to not get caught in traps. However, they can’t defend themselves from wolves. Lions, on the other hand, can easily scare away wolves, but lack the prudence to avoid being trapped. “Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.” (40). Machiavelli maintains that people are quite willing to be allowed themselves to be deceived, as emotions frequently get the better of human beings. Machiavelli then states that it’s quite impossible for a new prince to adhere to all the virtues mentioned above, seeing that they need to cement their power. Machiavelli describes even further, “For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand … Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.” (40). Machiavelli makes it clear that good reputations have a positive correlation with success: a prince, if he desires a favorable name, needs to protect his kingdom and maintain order. “For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest on.” (41). Machiavelli says that the thing which excites the most hatred and resentment is rapaciousness: “when neither their property nor their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.” (41). Machiavelli says that princes should try to make themselves seem as powerful, courageous, fair, and calm as possible, seeing that weakness, fickleness, frivolousness, selfishness, and stupidity are traits that are loathed greatly by the mass of humanity. Thus, there are two kinds of problems for princes, both of which can be greatly remedied when the common people like them: problems from the outside and internal issues. Princes can have their subjects defend them if there are external issues, and internal dissidence becomes difficult when the prince is popular, seeing that conspiracies require people to seek others out who also despise the prince, a phenomenon which is greatly decreased in its likelihood when most people are loyal to the existing government. Also adding to the fight against conspiracies is the fact that there have been many conspiracies in history, but few successful ones: one of the biggest factors is the existence of a traitor, seeing that it is quite rational for a conspirator to sell out the others in exchange for certain benefits, especially when the chance of success seems to be low and the threat of punishment appears imminent and severe. However, even if a prince tries to make friends, his good deeds can lead to his downfall, seeing that the army is an extremely important entity to appease. Machiavelli talks of ancient Rome, detailing that many emperors who were humane and pursued peace were thrown out or even executed by the army, as some members of the army craved war and bloodshed (as well as the corresponding booty). In one instance, the emperor Pertinax came after Commodus: he was quickly thrown out of office, as the soldiers were used to having the freedom to do whatever they wished under Commodus, and they couldn’t stomach the fact that their previous actions were restricted. “And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself-it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles-you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm.” (44). Another emperor, Alexander, was likely to have never put a man to death without a trial in his fourteen years as emperor: however, he was viewed as effeminate (his mother advised him) and was murdered by the army. On the opposite side of the spectrum, you have emperors like Commodus and Caracalla who have allowed their soldiers to do whatever they desired: their behavior was foolish, seeing that even though the army was satisfied, the people were disillusioned and disgruntled, leading to their downfalls. Machiavelli maintains that while violence may be inevitable to stay in power, one should be careful not to harm people on their side, especially when they rely on them for important tasks - in one incident, an extremely brutal emperor, Antoninus, was a very brave warrior but slaughtered a large number of Romans. In the end, he was murdered by a centurion who had lost his brother to his brutality some time prior (he was executed) and was frequently threatened by Antoninus, who still retained him as his bodyguard against all common sense. All in all, the lesson to be learned here is that of flexibility: one should try to appease as many people as possible while asserting dominance while avoiding extremities of behavior.
Machiavelli recommends that princes don’t take away the weapons of their countrymen in fear of rebellion. To begin, such an order is hard to enforce. Secondly, allowing them to keep their weapons can be read as a gesture of goodwill and trust, which can win the prince the positive opinion of his subjects. That is, “when you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms.” (47). Machiavelli says that princes should disarm the people of new territories which have been assimilated to prevent rebellion, seeing that it can be safely assumed that the prince already has a secure power base and army that can enforce obedience. Machiavelli maintains that a principality must not allow itself to be divided into factions, seeing how this will only spell disaster in an armed conflict. He also states that princes should embrace challenges, as when they overcome problems, they can show themselves as capable people who can overcome adversity and the odds. He then describes that many trusted advisors of princes were initially distrusted or even enemies, his logic being that although it may be hard to win people over to your side, if they are capable they will only be more loyal to you for showing understanding and clemency: “those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs.” (48). Machiavelli recommends princes to ally themselves with people who were content with the previous ruler than those who are discontented: those who want changes may be very hard to satisfy, while those who are fine with the way things are can be relied on for support, so long as their quality of life is upheld. Machiavelli acknowledges that fortresses can be useful: however, he states that he recommends them only to princes who are resented by their people, seeing how fortresses keep people out indiscriminately. Following his train of thought, he states that the energy that can go towards making fortresses can be used to better relations with the common people: he ends the section by saying that he wouldn’t judge anyone who builds fortresses, though he will not refrain from analyzing those who didn't care about what the public thought about them. Machiavelli states that princes, if they desire to be popular, must show their abilities. For instance, there are military campaigns and demonstrations of authority. Machiavelli says that princes should refrain from staying neutral, and should decisively choose one opinion or side over the other, seeing that neutrality allows both sides to harm you once the conflict is over. In his own words, “when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must now show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again.” (51). A caveat when it comes to alliances is to avoid linking oneself with a more powerful country on an aggressive campaign, seeing the potential for being betrayed. Machiavelli makes it clear that there is no completely safe path: there are only various degrees of risks. “Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil.” (51). Princes, to benefit the economy and their people, should encourage skilled professions and provide public festivities for the people to put them in a good mood. When it comes to choosing secretaries and other personal servants, princes should do their best to judge their character. Machiavelli elaborates that there are three classes of intellects: “one which comprehends by itself; another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless … whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.” (52-3). A fantastic test to see whether a servant is suitable or not is to think whether the servant is ambitious and overly selfish: if they seem to be always thinking of themselves, they are not suitable for the task. If the servant is deemed worthy, the prince should treat them well but also let them know their place: “the prince ought to study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread chances.” (53).
Machiavelli states that flatterers should be avoided at all times, as they encourage arrogance and stupidity. To avoid them, the court of the prince should consist of intelligent individuals who only speak when they are talked to and are given permission to be completely honest with their answers, as truth is preferable to emotional satisfaction. In his own words, “a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions.” (53). To reiterate, princes should be the ones asking the questions, and they should be the one calling meetings as well: they need to demonstrate that they’re in control. To summarize this section, princes should respect the truth, ask necessary questions, and patiently listen. Machiavelli describes that the princes of Italy lost their states and power due to their own mistakes, including not being well-versed in war, performing actions that caused the people to hate them, not intimidating the nobles so much that they know their place, and displeasing the army. Laziness is also a massive issue: some princes take peace for granted, and make few to no preparations for conflict. “Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them … it is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.” (55). Machiavelli moves on to discuss fortune. He admits that even though luck is massively important to one’s life (where you were born is beyond your control, as well as to what family, area, species, and time period), free will can greatly influence one’s actions and subsequent fate: to be specific, Machiavelli states that luck comprises one-half of a person’s life, while intentional action makes up the other-half, “or perhaps a little less.” (55). Machiavelli compares fortune to a roaring river, seeing how it can wipe away many people on a seemingly random basis. He again says that the prince who relies on fortune solely for his rule is finished in the long-run, and he states the following: “I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her, and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.” (57). Machiavelli then calls for Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici to become a hero and to liberate Italy from the foreigners and to restore her to her former glory: “Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in your illustrious house, with its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.” (58). Machiavelli then reveals what he believes to be the weaknesses of the foreigners: the Spaniards are weak against cavalry while the Switzers are terrified of infantry when engaged in hand-to-hand combat. He ends The Prince with the following: “It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new prince. This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love with which he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered so much from these foreign scourings … What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch: … Virtue against fury shall advance the fight, / And it i’ the’ combat soon shall put to flight: / For the old Roman valour is not dead, / Nor in the’ Italians’ brests extinguished.” (59-60).
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Personal thoughts:
The Prince by Nicolo Machiavelli is a great book due to the fact that it’s both realistic and pragmatic: Machiavelli makes it clear that although trying to do the right thing (ex. not hurting others and trying to be sympathetic and generous) is a very fine concept, doing so while doing certain things (aside from being a prince, think of acting as a politician or competing in an extremely tough job field) can lead to one’s downfall, seeing that others may betray and exploit you. While some criticize The Prince for being too cynical, it should be remembered that for most of human history, might did indeed make right, as military force rather than moral attitude determined victory. To demonstrate, there was an incident where a king as a youth, upon reading The Prince, criticized it for its contents: when he became the king, he ignored what he previously said about it and referred to it for his strategies, clearly demonstrating the fact that humanity can indeed be viewed from a self-interested standpoint. I highly recommend The Prince to anyone interested in power, strategies to acquire one’s desires (please note that one should not live like the ideal prince outlined in this book, seeing that intimidation and murder are illegal), the reality of humanity, politics, interpersonal relationships, and classics.
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